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The Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance
and the Foreseeability Test
The doctrine of impossibility is a concept in the law of contracts
used to grant relief to a promisor whose contractual performance be-
comes vitally different from what had reasonably been expected of
him due to the occurrence of a supervening event.' Generally speak-
ing, until 1863 impossibility of performance was not a defense to an
action for damages arising out of nonperformance. Taylor v.
Caldwell2 presented the first general formulation of the doctrine of
impossibility. In Taylor, an owner of a music hall was relieved of his
liability to pay damages for failing to have the hall available under the
terms of the lease when prior to the time of performance, the hall was
accidently destroyed by fire. The court granted relief on the principle
that:
in contracts in which the performance depends on the continued
existence of a given person or thing, a condition is implied that the
impossibility of performance arising from the perishing of the per-
son or thing shall excuse the performance. 3
Because of the principle's limited scope, relief was given only
where performance became impossible by certain types of superven-
ing events such as: the death or incapacity of a person whose services
were the subject of the contract; the destruction of the specific thing
1. For a general discussion of the doctrine of impossibility of performance see
6 A. ConIN, CONTRACTS, §§ 1320-72 (1962) [hereinafter cited as CoRNla]; 6 S.
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, §§ 1931-79 (rev. ed. S. Williston & G. Thompson 1938)[hereinafter cited as WILLISTON]; Patterson, Constructive Conditions in Contracts, 42
COLUM. L. REv. 901, 943 (1942) [hereinafter cited as Patterson]; Schlegel, Of Nuts
and Ships and Sealings Wax, Suez and Frustrating Things-The Doctrine of Impossi-
bility of Performance, 23 RUTGERS L. REv. 419 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Schlegel];
Note, The Fetish of Impossibility in the Law of Contracts, 53 COLUM. L. Rv. 94(1953) [hereinafter cited as The Fetish of Impossibility].
For the English treatment, see generally J. CHrTY, CHrrry ON CONrRACrs, §§ 1261-
1307 (1968); R. MCELRoY, IMPossriLrrY OF PERFORMANCE (1941) [hereinafter cited
as McELRoY]; Aubrey, Frustration Reconsidered--Some Comparative Aspects, 12 INT'L
AND COMpA TIVE LAW QUARTERLY 1165 (4th series 1963) [hereinafter cited as Aubrey].
2. 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (1863).
3. Id. at 314.
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that was contracted for or was essential to performance; or the prohi-
bition of performance by a subsequent change in the law.4
The common law trend has been to expand the number and kind of
situations in which a party may invoke impossibility of performance
as a defense. Today, "[a] thing is impossible in legal contemplation
when it is not practicable; and a thing is impracticable when it can
only be done at an excessive and unreasonable cost."5 The most mod-
em formulations of the doctrine of impossibility are found in section
2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code6 and section 281 of the Pro-
posed Draft of the Restatement of Contracts.7  Under the provisions of
the Code and Restatement, three conditions must be met if the promi-
sor is to be discharged from his obligation: (1) the performance must
be made impracticable by (2) the occurrence of a contingency, (3)
the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the
contract was entered.8
Traditionally, one of the conditions required for the application of
4. See L. SIMPSON, CONTRACTS, §§ 176-78 (1965); WILLISTON, supra note 1, §
1935; RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 458-61 (1932).
5. Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289, 293, 156 P. 458, 460 (1916)(citation omitted); City of Veron v. City of Los Angeles, 45 Cal. 2d 710, 290 P.2d 841(1955).
6. Section 2-615 of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE provides:
Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation and subject
to the preceding section on substituted performance:
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller who
complies with paragraphs (b) and (c) is not a breach of his duty under
a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been made impractica-
ble by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which
was a basic assumption on which the contract was made or by compli-
ance in good faith with any applicable foreign or domestic govern-
mental regulation or order whether or not it later proves to be invalid.(b) Where the causes mentioned in paragraph (a) affect only a part of the
seller's capacity to perform, hse must allocate production and deliveries
among his customers but may at his option include regular customers
not then under contract as well as his own requirements for further
manufacture. He may so allocate in any manner which is fair and
reasonable.
(c) The seller must notify the buyer seasonably that there will be delay or
non-delivery and, when allocation is required under paragraph (b), of
the estimated quota thus made available for the buyer.
7. Section 281 of the proposed draft of the RESTATEMENT OF THE LAw (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1974) provides:
Where, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable
without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which
was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, his duty to render
that performance is discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indi-
cate the contrary.
8. For a discussion of the doctrine of impossibility as now formulated in U.C.C.§ 2-615 see Symposium, The U.C.C. and Contract Law: Some Selected Problems, 105
U. PA. L. REV. 837, 880 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Symposium]; Gilbride, The Uni-form Commercial Code: Impact on the Law of Contracts, 30 BROOKLYN L. REv.
197-98 (1964); Spies, Article 2: Breach, Repudiation and Excuse, 30 Mo. L. REv.
225, 253 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Spies].
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the doctrine of impossibility was that the event which made perform-
ance impossible must have been unforeseen by the parties at the time
the contract was made.9 Where the event was found to be foreseeable,
courts have denied relief unless the party seeking relief had provided
for the contingency in his contract.' ° In this situation, if the event was
foreseeable, courts inferred that since the party did not provide for the
contingency, he assumed the risk of its occurrence. Consequently,
courts held the party liable for damages even though his performance
might have been commercially impracticable. Considering the tradi-
tional legal rationale used for granting relief under the doctrine of im-
possibility, this conclusion by the courts seems proper. For if relief is
premised on the notion that the parties intended that a state of facts
remain unchanged, the foreseeability of the event would bar courts
from finding such an intention with regard to an event that was fore-
seeable.
The modem legal rationale of impossibility is not premised on the
intention of the parties as to the continued existence of a state of facts;
rather, it is based on the court's balancing the community's interest in
having contracts enforced according to their terms against the com-
mercial senselessness of requiring performance." Both the Code and
Restatement adopt this rationale through the use of the term "imprac-
ticable" as opposed to "impossible."
Because of the expansion of the doctrine of impossibility, a number
of writers have expressed their dissatisfaction with the continued use
of the foreseeability test as a barrier to the application of the doctrine
of impossibility.' 2 The argument against the use of foreseeability is
9. See 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 463(2) (1963); 17 AM. JuR. 2d Contracts § 406
(1964).
10. See, e.g., Chicago, M. & St. P. R.R. v. Hoyt, 149 U.S. 1 (1892); Berg v. Erick-
son, 234 F. 817, (8th Cir. 1916); Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 1.53 P.2d 47 (1944);
City of Minneapolis v. Republic Creosoting Co., 151 Minn. 178, 201 N.W. 414 (1924);
Nebaco, Inc. v. Riverview Realty Co., 87 Nev. 55, 482 P.2d 305 (1971); American Cap-
ital Corp. v. McCants, 510 S.W.2d 901 (Tenn. 1974); United Sales Co. v. Curtis Peanut
Co., 302 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957). See also Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d 12, 35
(1962). A concept closely akin to the doctrine of impossibility is frustration of con-
tract. The essential difference between the two concepts is that, under the former the-
ory, one party's performance has become impossible or commercially impracticable.
See, e.g., Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289, 156 P. 458 (1916). Under
the latter theory, the frustrated party's own performance has not become impossible, but
his promisee's counter-performance has become of little value. See, e.g., LaCurnbre
Golf & Country Club v. Santa Barbara Hotel Co., 205 Cal. 422, 271 P. 476 (1928).
The foreseeability test is treated the same under both concepts. For this reason, the
two concepts will be treated the same for purposes of this article.
11. See Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir.
1966); CORBIN, supra note 1, § 1331.
12. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAw (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, 43 (Tent. Draft No.
9, 1974); WILLISTON, supra note 1, § 1953; Aubrey, supra note 1, at 1184; Farnsworth,
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that the test penalizes a party for failing to forecast all future contin-
gencies and to deal with them in the contract. In addition, the foresee-
ability test fails to question whether the party actually assumed or
should assume the risk of the supervening event. The purpose of this
article is to examine the criticisms of the foreseeability test, to exam-
ine its application under the Code, and to formulate criteria which
may lead to better results when this test is applied.
CRITICISMS OF THE FORESEEABILITY TEST
The first criticism made against this test is that it employs the rea-
sonable man standard in determining whether an event is forsee-
able."3 No doubt such a standard has a great working value for the
court, but it penalizes an individual who fails to foresee the foresee-
able.14 The foreseeability test assumes that parties entering a contract
are aware of all the possible contingencies existing at the time the con-
tract was made. In reality, this is not true. When parties enter into the
contracting process, it is unlikely they perceive all the possible
contingencies which may impede their performance. Rather, parties
limit their attention to a number of situations which they choose by
some initial process of selection. Between businessmen, the most like-
ly situations on which the parties focus their attention are those which
relate to performance and price, as opposed to contingencies that may
interfere with performance.15
Situations have arisen where the court has misapplied the test.
Some courts have held that a party should have reduced his qualifica-
tions to writing under circumstances where not even a reasonable man
could have anticipated the supervening event.' 6 In one case an event
Disputes Over Omissions in Contracts, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 860, 884-87 (1968) [herein-
after cited as Farnsworth]; Smit, Frustration of Contract: A Comparative Attempt At
Consolidation, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 287 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Smit]; Note, The
Fetish of Impossibility, supra note 1, at 98 n.23. Cf. R. ANDERsO N, 2 UNFORM COM-
MERCUL CODE § 2-615:13 (1971); Patterson, supra note 1, at 952; Comment, Contract
-Frustration of Purpose, 59 MICH. L. REv. 98, 103 (1960).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Buffalo Coal Mining Co., 345 F.2d 517 (9th Cir.
1965); cf. Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289, 156 P. 458 (1916).
14. Foreseeability as used in the law of contracts with respect to damages differs
from its use as applied to the doctrine of impossibility. Foreseeability serves as a limita-
tion on risk assumption, in the case of contract damages, as opposed to the enlargement
of risk assumption in the case of impossibility. Furthermore, in situations employing
the doctrine of impossibility the promisor's conduct does not create the risk of the super-
vening event. However, in the case of contract damages, the promisors conduct is
what creates the risk. For a general discussion of the concept of foreseeability as ap-
plied to contract damages see CosIN, supra note 1, §§ 1006-13.
15. See Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28
AM. SOCIOLOGICAL Rnv. 55, 60 (1963); Farnsworth, supra note 12, at 868-72.
16. See, e.g., Wills v. Shockley, 157 A.2d 252 (Del. Super. 1960); Berline v. Wald-
shmidt, 159 Kan. 585, 156 P.2d 865 (1945).
578
Vol. 6: 575
Impossibility Doctrine
was found to be foreseeable even though the parties testified that at
the time of contracting neither one of them anticipated the subsequent
change in events. 17  Furthermore, the test has been used when in
all likelihood resort to the concept was unnecessary because the
court could have reached the same result by applying a different
analysis. 1
8
The greatest hardships are created by use of the foreseeability test
in cases where the source of difficulty could be said to be foreseeable,
but the nature and extent of the risk were not. An example of this sit-
uation was evidenced in Morrow, Inc. v. Paugh,19 where the promisor
contracted to lease a truck. The contract provided that the truck was
to be returned in the same condition save normal wear and tear. Sub-
sequently, the truck was accidently destroyed by fire through no fault
of the promisor. Certainly, the promisor assumed and foresaw the risk
of destruction through his own negligence but did not anticipate de-
struction by fire without any fault on his part. However, the court held
that the promisor should have foreseen the possibility of destruction
by fire and provided for it in his contract.20
The first criticism, therefore, has centered on the court's determina-
tion of whether the event was foreseeable by the party at the time he
entered the contract. Though the test may be probative in determining
whether the party should be held to have assumed the risk of the fore-
seeable event, it ignores whether the party was actually aware of the
possible contingency or whether he appreciated the potential harm
which the event could cause. For these reasons, foreseeability should
not be conclusive in determining whether the party assumed the risk
of the foreseeable event.
17. Megan v. Updike Grain Corp., 94 F.2d 551 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S.
663 (1938).
18. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 153 P.2d 47 (1944) (evidence avail-
able that lessee was trying to find a way out of a bad bargain); Gold v. Salem Lutheran
Home Ass'n of the Bay Cities, 53 Cal. 2d 289, 347 P.2d 687 (1960) (aleatory contract
i.e., contract premised on the happening or non-happening of an event); Portland Sec-
tion of Counsel of Jewish Women v. Sisters of Charity, 513 P.2d 1183 (Ore. 1973) (per-
petual contract for the care of on designated person); Salinger v. General Exchange
Insurance Corp., 217 Iowa 560, 250 N.W. 13 (1933) (defendant could have taken the
step to prevent his performance from becoming impossible).
19. 120 Ind. App. 458, 91 N.E.2d 858 (1950) (en banc); Mitchell v. Ceazan Tires,
Inc., 25 Cal. 2d 45, 153 P.2d 53 (1944) (general "war talk" at the time party entered
lease contract made it reasonably foreseeable that government would restrict the sales
of tires. However, defendant did not anticipate that such restrictions would reduce sales
by 99 percent). However, most commentators disagree with such cases. "Foreseeability
of the source of difficulty does not, therefore, preclude unforeseeability of the extent of
the difficulty from being a basis for relief." Aubrey, supra note 1, at 1185 n.71.
20. 120 Ind. App. at 464-65, 91 N.E.2d at 860-61.
579
1975
Loyola University Law Journal
The second criticism levied against the foreseeability test is that it
infers that a party has assumed the risk of the supervening event by
failing to provide for it." The difficulty with this assumption of risk
theory is that it fails to question whether the party actually did assume
or should assume the risk of the supervening event. Many factors en-
ter into the contracting process which may prevent one from inserting
a clause covering all of the possible contingencies which may be fore-
seen at the time of contracting. Such factors as the parties' business re-
lationship, their bargaining position, and a party's ability to draft an
all-inclusive excuse clause may result in the absence of a contract
provision. Moreover, some of the same factors which prevent the in-
sertion of a clause may be probative of the party's non-assumption of
risk.
Because of the parties commercial practice and trade usage, they
may feel there is no need to bargain over an excuse clause. If the par-
ties have been able to work their problems out in the past, they proba-
bly believe they will be able to do so in the future. Moreover, the atti-
tude of some businessmen towards the use of contracts may
discourage another party from attempting to insert a clause for
fear that pressing the issue may cause delay or a breakdown in
negotiations.2"
Commercial practice and trade usage may also be probative of non-
assumption of risk where a foreseeable contingency makes perform-
ance commercially impracticable.2 3 Evidence that parties have shared
the losses created by contingencies in the past could serve as justifica-
21. In Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 54, 153 P.2d 47, 58 (1944), the court stated:
The purpose of a contract is to place the risks of performance upon the prom-
isor, and the relation of the parties, terms of the contract, and circumstances
surrounding its formation must be examined to determine whether it can be
fairly inferred that the risk of the event that has supervened to cause the al-
leged frustration was not reasonably foreseeable. If it was foreseeable there
should have been provision for it in the contract, and the absence of such a
provision gives rise to the inference that the risk was assumed.
Cf., West Los Angeles Inst. for Cancer Research v. Mayer, 366 F.2d 220, 225 n.9; Smit,
supra note 12, at 314.
22. In the drafting of contracts between parties having fair equality of bargain-
ing power, the words finally written in the instrument are often the result of a
hard-fought compromise. To inject too many imaginable catastrophes into the
negotiations is to cause irritation, doubt, even frustration of making.
Patterson, supra note 1, at 946. See also Farnsworth, supra note 12, at 886.
23. See Berman, Excuse for Nonperformance in the Light of Contract Practices in
International Trade, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1413 (1963), where the writer suggests that
in the area of international trade, if the parties have not expressly qualified their prom-
ise, the obligor assumes all other risks. The Uniform Commercial Code recognizes that
the history of prior dealings is very important in settling disputes. UNIFORM COMMER-
CAL CODE § 1-205. But see A.L. Jones & Co. v. Cochran, 33 Okla. 431, 126 P. 716(1912), where evidence of custom of trade which excused a grower when his crop failed
was excluded by the court. For further discussion, see text accompanying note 70 infra.
580
Vol. 6: 575
Impossibility Doctrine
tion for allocating the burden of loss over both parties under the
present contractual relationship.
Another factor which contributes to the absence of a provision cov-
ering possible contingencies, even where the event is foreseeable, is
the bargaining power each party possesses. A requirement that if the
event is foreseeable, the party must expressly qualify his promise as-
sumes he is capable of doing so. However, this is not true when the
bargaining power of the parties is disproportionate. For this reason,
when a party has no say over the terms of the contract he is at the
mercy of the stronger party and must hope that the stronger party will
be self-sacrificing when performance turns out to be commercially
impracticable."4 Here again, the absence of a provision may be more
probative of the non-assumption of risk rather than the assumption of
it. In cases where the party has no control over the terms of the con-
tract, such factors as the superior knowledge of the stronger party and
the nature of contract may indicate that the weaker party does not as-
sume the risk of all foreseeable contingencies existing at the time of
negotiation. For instance, contracts for the manufacture of a particu-
lar product according to the terms and specifications of a stronger
party present a situation where the weaker party should be able to as-
sume that such an undertaking is possible without having to qualify
his promise."
A final factor which contributes to the absence of contractual lan-
guage dealing with possible contingencies is the inability of laymen to
forecast all the possible risks and deal with them in one all-inclusive
clause. Businessmen who do attempt to forecast future developments
and provide for them in their agreements oftentimes find their efforts
to be in vain because of the court's ejusdem generis construction of
the clause. Under a ejusdem generis construction, general words fol-
lowing specific words are read to include only things of the same type
and nature as those described by the specific words.26 The case of Ex-
celsior Motor Mfg. & Supply Co. v. Sound Equipment27 demonstrates
the court's use of this rule of construction. In Excelsior, the defendant
24. See, e.g., Savage v. Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 249 Ore. 147, 432 P.2d 519 (1967).
The Savage court recognized that bidding on construction contracts is very competitive
and one has little choice on the terms of the agreement. See text accompanying notes
64 through 66 infra.
25. For further discussion, see text accompanying note 61 infra.
26. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 608 (4th rev. ed. 1968); see, e.g., Traylor v. Crucible
Steel Co. of America, 183 N.Y.S. 181, 192 App. Div. 445 (1920); Smith v. First Nat.
Bank, 114 Okl. 293 (1926), 245 P. 653.
27. 73 F.2d 725 (7th Cir. 1934).
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seller sought relief under a clause which excused the seller "on the
happening of such contingencies as may be provided against in the
contract, such as an embargo, war, or causes beyond his control."2
The seller was unable to perform on time because of engineering and
other mechanical difficulties, and he sought to be excused under the
"causes beyond his control" clause. The court refused him this relief,
holding that the clause, on ejusdem generis grounds, covered only
those casualties that were similar to those specifically listed.29
Despite the court's narrow construction of excuse provisions, the
terms of an excuse provision though not covering a particular contin-
gency may reflect the nature of the risk which a businessman thinks
should excuse his performance. To this extent, a provision which ex-
cuses a seller for "causes beyond his control" may be probative of the
non-assumption of risk. 0
In addition to drafting problems imposed by ejusdem generis con-
struction, there is some question as to whether a seller can insert a
clause which would give him more relief than presently available un-
der section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Comment 8 of
section 2-615 states:
Generally, express agreements as to exemptions designed to enlarge
upon or supplant the provisions of this section are to be read in the
light of mercantile sense and reason, for this section itself sets up
the commercial standard for normal and reasonable interpreta-
tion and provides a minimum ,beyond which agreement may not
go.31
Though no reasons are given for why a seller should not be able to
shift more of a risk upon his buyer, it would appear that this comment
should be read together with the Code's provisions on good faith and
unconscionable contracts.12 One writer believes the drafters did not
intend this provision to bar a seller from contracting for greater
relief.83
This second criticism demonstrates that the mere fact that a party
has not qualified his promise should not necessarily be used to infer
that he assumed the risk of the foreseeable event. Factors which con-
tribute to the absence of a provision covering a foreseeable contingen-
28. Id. at 728.
29. Id.
30. See Patterson, supra note 1, at 950.
31. UmFonmj COMMERCIAL CODE, § 2-615, Comment 8.
32. Id. §§ 1-203, 2-302.
33,. See Hawkland, The Energy Crisis and Section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 79 CoM. LJ. 75 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Hawkland].
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cy may well be probative of the promisor's non-assumption of risk.
For this reason, the court should be conscious of factors other than
foreseeability and the absence of a provision excusing the promisor in
determining risk assumption.
FORESEEABILITY UNDER THE CODE
The historical development of section 2-615 presents a valuable
starting point for examining the role of foreseeability under the Code.
Unlike many of the Code's provisions, section 2-615 has no official
counterpart in the former Uniform Sales Act. Section 2-615 is the
work of Professor Karl Llewellyn who drafted a similar provision for
the Revised Uniform Sales Act. Though one writer has stated that the
Code should not have attempted to codify the doctrine of impossibili-
ty," Llewellyn contended that a Code provision was essential to com-
pensate for inadequacies of the common law doctrine of impossibility.
One of these inadequacies was the lack of protection the common law
afforded businessmen who for one reason or another were unable to
insert an excuse clause in their contracts. s 5 To correct this situation,
Llewellyn prepared section 87 of the proposed Revised Uniform Sales
Act."8 Llewellyn was of the opinion that businessmen should have
protection without the need for a clause granting them relief.
3 7
Though it was never enacted as a provision of the Uniform Sales
Act, section 87 was carried forward verbatim into the May 1949 draft
of the Uniform Commercial Code. Section 87 opened with the prefa-
tory language "[b]etween merchants unless otherwise agreed.""8  In
this form, section 87 provided relief to a party despite the absence of a
provision dealing with a specific contingency so long as the party
seeking excuse met the other requirements of the section. Because the
drafters feared the prefatory language of section 87 could be read to
34. See R. NORDSTROM, LAW OF SALES, § 110 (1970).
35. For further discussion, see text accompanying notes 21 through 29 supra.
36. Section 87 of the proposed REVISED UNIFORM SALES ACT (unpublished), quoted
in Hawkland, supra note 33, at 77, states:
Between merchants unless otherwise agreed and subject to section 86 on substi-
tuted performance
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller who
complies with paragraph (b) and (c) is not a breach of his duly under a
contract for sale if performance as agreed has been made commercially im-
practicable by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which
was a basic assumption on which the contract was made or by compliance
in good faith with any applicable foreign or domestic governmental regula-
tion or order whether or not it later proves to be invalid. ...
37. Unpublished Papers of Karl Llewellyn, cited in Hawkland, supra note 33, at 77.
38. See note 36 supra.
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give relief to a party who in fact assumed the risk of a foreseeable
event,"9 the 1949 version of 2-615 was amended to read "[eixcept so
far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation.14 0 The effect of
this change was to give relief so long as the party seeking relief did not
specifically assume the risk of the foreseeable event.
Thus, the main barrier to relief under the Code is the question of
risk assumption and not foreseeability. To the extent foreseeability is
probative of risk assumption, foreseeability is a barrier to relief under
the Code. But because foreseeability is not a conclusive factor of risk
assumption, it can be argued that relief is available even where the
party foresaw the event where evidence is available which would ne-
gate risk assumption. Such factors as the extent and degree of loss
which the event creates as compared to those risks normally assumed
by current business practices, the remoteness of the foreseeable event
from those generally encountered in the particular trade or business,
the parties prior dealings, and the nature and purpose of the contract
may negate the inference that a party assumed the risk of the fore-
seeable event."'
In addition to the Code's non-conclusive attitude toward foreseea-
bility, the question of when an event should be considered foreseeable
appears to require a more subjective analysis. Comment 1 to section
2-615 provides:
This section excuses a seller from timely delivery of goods con-
tracted for, where his performance has become commercially im-
practicable because of unforeseen supervening circumstances not
within the contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting.4 2
Requiring the contingency to have been within the contemplation of
the parties directs the court to focus its attention on the nature of the
risk, the terms of the contract, and the surrounding circumstances in
order to determine if the parties contemplated the possible contingen-
cy. It might be argued that this analysis requires the determination of
whether the parties were actually aware of the possible contingency at
the time of contracting as opposed to whether they should have been
aware of it.
39. See Haw'kland, supra note 33, at 78.
40. The statute is set out in full at note 6 supra.
41. See Symposium, supra note 8, at 882-83; Schlegel, supra note 1, at 447-48;
CoRBIN, supra note 1, § 1333, at 371; RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (SEcoND) OF CoN-
TRACTS, supra note 12, at 49. One writer suggests that the test to be applied under sec-
tion 2-615 should be "how remote the contingency is from the contract, how clearly it
falls within the contemplated business risks, and assurance that whatever contingencies
develop are outside the seller's control." Spies, supra note 8, at 253. For further dis-
cussion, see text accompanying notes 58 through 71 infra.
42. UmFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615, Comment I (emphasis added).
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The apparent willingness of the Code to allow relief despite the
foreseeability of an event is a welcomed improvement to the doctrine
of impossibility. However, whether the courts are prepared to apply a
more realistic foreseeability test is yet to be seen. There is some indi-
cation that they are. 43 Perhaps the reluctance on the part of courts to
apply a more realistic test is in part due to the traditional purposes the
test served and the lack of criteria by which to determine risk
assumption.
FORMULATING CRITERIA
The present version of the foreseeability test serves essentially three
purposes. First, it encourages parties entering into a contract to antici-
pate and expressly provide for possible contingencies. Second, it pro-
vides an easy method for courts to allocate the losses arising from the
supervening event. And third, it prevents expanding the doctrine of
impossibility so far as to furnish a possible means of escape for
the unscrupulous party who is seeking to evade a just contractual
obligation.
However, the foreseeability test as administered under the common
law has outlived its usefulness. Parties do not look to the law of con-
tracts for guidance in their business conduct, but rather they look to it
for enforcement of or relief from their contracts. For both social and
economic reasons it is good that parties are encouraged to perform
their promises. However, the notion that a contract promise is abso-
lute and that relief will not be given where the party foresaw the possi-
ble contingency and did not provide for it leads to inequitable results
in some cases. 44 Furthermore, simplicity in administration of the doc-
trine of impossibility does not justify the failure of the court to ask the
more difficult question: should this party be relieved from his con-
tractual obligation? Nor does the fear that the unscrupulous party will
seek relief justify a refusal to apply a more realistic foreseeability
test.
The real inquiry under the doctrine of impossibility should be to
determine whether the contract has become commercially impractica-
ble and whether the party seeking relief has assumed the risk of the
supervening event. Commercial impracticability is the determination
by the court that performance has become vitally different from that
43. See note 48 infra and accompanying text.
44. For further discussion, see text accompanying notes 19 through 20 supra.
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which the party reasonably expected at the time the contract was
made.4" This determination is made by balancing the community's in-
terest in having contracts enforced according to their terms against
the commercial senslessness of requiring performance."6 On the other
hand, assumption of risk is the determination by the court that the
party undertook to perform despite how different his performance
might subsequently become.47 In making this latter determination the
court must look to the facts surrounding the making of the contract.
To this extent, foreseeability may be one factor which is probative of
risk assumption. However, it should not be a conclusive factor barring
relief under the doctrine.
A number of courts have recognized that foreseeability is only pro-
bative of risk allocation.4" In Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United
States,49 a suit arising out of the closing of the Suez Canal, the court
by way of dicta observed that the mere fact the parties were aware of
hostilities between Israel and Egypt and the subsequent nationaliza-
tion of the canal by Egypt did not necessarily mean the shipper as-
sumed the risk of the canal's closing. The court stated:
Foreseeability or even recognition of a risk does not necessarily
prove its allocation. Parties to a contract are not always able to
provide for all the possibilities of which they are aware, sometimes
45. Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 54, 153 P.2d 47, 50 (1944); WILLISTON, supra
note 1, § 1931. The U.C.C. speaks of impracticability as an alteration in the essential
nature of performance. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615, Comment 4. Compare
the English test which centers on whether the supervening event has made performance
of the contract "a thing radically different from that which was undertaken by the con-
tract." Ocean Tramp Tankers Corp. v. V/O Sovfracht (the Eugenia), 2 Q.B. 226, 239(1964). Obviously, the point at which a contract becomes impracticable is not subject
to easy determination. Essentially, it must turn on the hardships created by the super-
vening event and the commercial senselessness of requiring performance. For further
discussion, see text accompanying note 11 supra.
46. Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. U.S., 363 F.2d 312, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1966).47. If the party expressly assumed the risk of performance, the determination isbased upon the parties' expressed intention. Where no expressed assumption exists, the
court bases its decision on its own sense of justice as gleaned from the surrounding cir-
cumstances at the time the parties entered the contract. See CORBIN, supra note 1, §§1328 and 1331; G. GiusMoRE, LAW OF CoNTAc'rs, § 176 (1947); Smit, supra note 12,
at 313; Note, The Fetish of Impossibility, supra note 1; Symposium, supra note 8, at
889.
48. See, e.g., L. N. Jackson & Co. v. Royal Norwegian Gov't, 177 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.
1949); Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966);
West Los Angeles Institute for Cancer Research v. Mayer, 366 F.2d 220 (9th Cir.), cert.denied, 385 U.S. 1010 (1966). In some cases relief was given despite foreseeability.
20th Century Lites v. Goodman, 64 Cal. App. 2d 938, 149 P.2d 88 (1944); Whelan
v. Griffith, 170 A.2d 229 (D.C. Mun. App. 1944). Foreseeability has been used to
show the non-assumption of risk. Johnson v. Atkins, 53 Cal. App. 2d 430, 127 P.2d1027 (1942); Fatelli Pantanella v. International Commercial Corp., 89 N.Y.S.2d 736(1949); Housing Authority of the City of Bristol v. East Tennessee Light and Power
Co., 183 Va. 64, 31 S.E.2d 273 (1944).
49. 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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because they cannot agree, often simply because they are too busy.
Moreover, that some abnormal risk was contemplated is probative
but does not necessarily establish an allocation of the risk of the
contingency which actually occurred.50
Under the present version of the foreseeability test, if an event is
foreseeable the court requires the party to have provided for it in his
contract. Finding no provision, the court then draws the inference
that the party had assumed the risk. Such an inference should not be
drawn until a full inquiry into the facts surrounding the making of the
contract has been made.
In investigating the facts the court's initial inquiry should be
whether the event was contemplated by the parties at the time of con-
tracting. This need not be an inquiry into the subjective state of minds
of the individuals. As one writer stated:
"Contemplation" is appropriate to describe the mental state of
philosophers but is scarcely descriptive of the mental state of busi-
nessmen making a bargain. 5'
Nevertheless, the court should attempt to determine if the party seek-
ing excuse was aware of not only the possibility, but also the probabil-
ity of the contingencies interfering with the contract. This determina-
tion can be made from the terms of the contract and the surrounding
circumstances.
First, the negotiations leading up to the making of the contract may
reveal the party's awareness. One might argue that the parol evidence
rule would bar the admissibility of such evidence where the contract
was fully integrated. However, the better view is that the parol evi-
dence rule only bars the use of negotiations for purposes of adding to
or varying the written agreement and not for the purpose of determin-
ing whether the event was foreseeable."
Courts might also consider provisions in similar contracts entered
by the party seeking to be relieved of performance to see similar con-
tracts by the party seeking excuse if the "unforeseen" events had been
by the party seeking to be relieved of performance to see if the "un-
foreseen" events had been provided in those contracts. In Glidden Co.
v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd.,53 another case arising out of the closing of the
Suez Canal, the court took cognizance of the promisor's successful in-
50. Id. at 318 (citations omitted).
51. Patterson, supra note 1, at 947.
52. See Farnsworth, supra note 12, at 887; McElroy, supra note 1, at 243; Glidden
v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 275 F.2d 253, 256-57 (2d Cir. 1960).
53. 275 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1960).
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sertion of a relief clause in another contract covering the possibility of
the canal's closing. The Glidden court considered this information to be
probative of the party's awareness."'
Finally, the nature and source of the event and its remoteness to the
subject matter covered in the contract may be an indication of wheth-
er it was the type of risk that a businessman would generally be aware
of. For example, a normal rise or decline in prices as a result of nor-
mal market supply and demand is the type of event which most rea-
sonable businessmen are conscious of on a daily basis. 5 Yet a marked
increase in cost caused by an oil embargo, a general strike or govern-
ment imposed rationing or restrictions are contingencies which might
be so remote as to indicate the party's lack of awareness.5
In each case the court will be presented with a different set of facts.
Though the three suggested factors mentioned above 7 may not be ap-
plicable in all cases, they do present the type and nature of evidence
which a court should consider in determining whether an event was
foreseeable.
After having determined whether the event was foreseeable, the
court must then determine whether the promisor should be held to
have assumed the risk. Generally, the court will try to base its deter-
mination on the intentions of the parties. However, where the parties
have failed to express their intentions, such an analysis is impossible.
For this reason, it would appear that the court in making any determi-
nation as to risk assumption is premising its decision not only on the
foreseeability of the event but also on its own sense of justice. The
court, in essence, is weighing the loss suffered by the promisor against
the potential disappointment of the promisee's expectation interest. 5
For this reason, any determination as to whether a party assumed the
risk of contingency not expressly provided for should also be based on
consideration of factors such as: the nature, purpose and terms of the
contract; the commercial senselessness of requiring performance; the
bargaining positions of the parties; and, the ability of the individual
54. id. at 257.
55. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615, Comment. 4.
56. Id. The degree of foreseeability required should approach virtual certainty as
opposed to a mere outside chance. McElroy, supra note 1, at 244. Cf. Note, UCC
§ 2-615: Sharp Inflationary Increases in Cost as Excuse from Performance of Contract,
50 NoTRE DAME LAWYER 297, 304-06 (1974). For further discussion, see note 41 su-
pra.
57. See text accompanying note 52 through 56 supra.
58. The problem is that of allocating, in the most generally satisfactory way, the
risks of harm and disappointment that result from the supervening events. CORBIN,
supra note 1, at 327.
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party to insure against the disabling event or to bear or distribute the
loss. All of these factors represent policy considerations in determin-
ing where the loss should fall. Each might be said to be premised on
the theory that it is better for the loss to be placed upon one party as
opposed to the other and in some instances on both.
Consideration has been given to the nature, purpose and terms of
the contract by some courts in determining where the risk of the su-
pervening event should be placed. For example, in United States v.
Wegematic, 9 the Federal Reserve Board invited five electronic manu-
facturers to submit proposals for an intermediate-type, general pur-
pose electronic digital computer. The defendant submitted its bid
characterizing its machine as a "truly revolutionary system utilizing
all of the latest technical advances."60 The Board accepted the de-
fendant's bid on the assumption that the defendant was capable of
producing such a machine. Subsequently, the defendant encountered
engineering difficulties and sought cancellation of the contract on the
grounds of impossibility. The court held that since the purpose of the
contract was not for the development of a computer but rather for the
furnishing of a computer, the risk of all engineering difficulties rested
on the defendant. Hence, the Wegematic court was influenced in
making its determination as to risk assumption by the purpose of the
contract as evidenced by the nature of the agreement.
59. 360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966). Other cases where the court has been influenced
by such factors as the nature, purpose and terms of the contract include B.P. Ducas v.
Bayer Co., 163 N.Y.S. 32, 36 (1916), wherein the court construed the terms "contin-
gencies beyond their control" as shifting the risk of every contingency whether foreseen
or not. The speculative or aleatory nature of the contract has influenced some courts
in determining risk assumption. Shedd-Bartush Foods of Illinois v. Commodity Credit
Corp., 135 F. Supp. 78 (N.D. Il. 1955), afj'd., 231 F.2d 555 (7th Cir. 1956) (specula-
tive); Gold v. Salem Lutheran Home Ass'n of the Bay Cities, 53 Cal. 2d 289, 347 P.2d
687 (1960) (aleatory). The purpose of the contract was considered in National Presto
Industries, Inc. v. United States, 338 F.2d 99 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 962
(1965), where the court held that a government procurement contract resembled a "joint
enterprise" experiment in which the government was not only concerned with the end
product but with the process as well. The court gave relief to the promisor for unex-
pected expenses on the theory of mutual mistake. Presto, supra, at 109. Cf., Natus
Corp. v. United States, 371 F.2d 450 (Ct. Cl. 1967). Consider also West Los Angeles
Institute for Cancer Research v. Mayer, 366 F.2d 220 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1010 (1965), wherein the purpose of the contract was to allow the promisor to take ad-
vantage of tax savings. Subsequently, the tax commissioner ruled in an unrelated case
that such tax advantages would not be allowed on transactions similar to the promisor's.
The court held that since one of the purposes of the contract was to enable the promisor
to take advantage of possible tax savings, he did not assume the risk of the unfavorable
tax ruling even though such was foreseeable. For other cases where the purpose of the
contract influenced the court's decision, see 20th Century Lites, Inc. v. Goodman, 64
Cal. App. 2d 938, 149 P.2d 88 (1944); Portland Section of Counsel of Jewish Women
v. Sisters of Charity, 513 P.2d 1183 (Ore. 1973); Hinchman v. City Waters Co., 179
Tenn. 545, 167 S.W.2d 986 (1943).
60. 360 F.2d at 675.
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Another approach some courts have used in determining risk as-
sumption is an examination of the expertise of the parties and to de-
termine which party drafted the contract terms and what the other
party expected. For example, in Helene Curtis Industries, Inc. v.
United States,6 the court held that a contractor did not assume the
risk of non-performance where the government, who drafted the terms
of the contract, knew or should have known that its specifications could
not be met. This type of analysis is premised on the theory that a party
who has undertaken to perform according to the other party's specifica-
tions should be able to assume that performance in accordance with the
terms of the contract is possible.
Another factor that should be examined in assessing risk assump-
tion is the commercial senselessness of requiring a party to perform.
In circumstances where this factor has been held controlling, the
courts have determined that the promisor did not assume the degree
of risk which is created by the supervening event. For example, in
Whelan v. Griffith Consumers Co.,62 the defendant contracted to de-
liver fuel oil to the plaintiff's farm home. The defendant failed to
make a timely delivery because of a 14 inch snow fall. Because of the
defendant's failure, the plaintiff's water pipes froze. The court denied
plaintiff's claim for damages on the grounds that under the circum-
stances the driver of the defendant's truck was not required to defy
the elements and plow into an impassable roadway. Thus, the court
based its decision as to risk assumption on the senselessness of requir-
ing defendant's performance.
As mentioned earlier, 63 one of the criticisms levied against the fore-
seeability test is the hardships it creates where the party did not appre-
ciate the extent and nature of the foreseeable risk. This hardship is re-
61. 312 F.2d 774 (Ct. Cl. 1963); cf., R.M. Hollingshead Corp. v. United States, 111
F. Supp. 285 (Ct. CI. 1953) (contractor was under no duty to determine if compliance
with government specifications could produce the desired result); City of Littleton v.
Employers Fire Insurance Co., 169 Col. 104, 453 P.2d 810 (1969) (promisor did not
assume the risk that a water tank could be built according to the plans). Compare Hol-
Gar Mfg. Co., A.S.B.C.A. No. 6865, 62 BCA 3551, rev'd, Hol-Gar Mfg. Co. v.
United States, 360 F.2d 634 (Ct. Cl. 1966), where the Armed Service Board of Contact
Appeals held that an experienced contractor who accepts a fixed-price contract to pro-
duce an item never before made under performance specifications assumes the risk that
performance may be impossible.
62. 170 A.2d 229 (D.C. Mun. App. 1944). See also Mineral Park Land Co. v. How-
ard, 172 Cal. 289, 156 P. 458 (1916) (court relieved promisor of his duty to excavate
gravel which laid beneath the water level and would have cost 10 or 12 times more than
originally expected); Mitchell Canneries, Inc. v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 498 (Ct. Cl.
1948) (promisor did not assume the risk of local crop failure and was not expected to
complete his contract by going out of state to secure substitute); Northern Corp. v.
Chugach Electric Ass'n, 518 P.2d 76 (Alaska 1974).
63. For further discussion, see text accompanying note 19 supra.
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moved when commercial senselessness as well as foreseeability is
considered in determining the assumption of risk question.
Two other factors which also should be considered by the court are
the bargaining positions of the parties and the ability of the parties to
bear or distribute the losses. These two factors have not received
much attention by the courts in deciding the risk assumption issue.
Where the bargaining strength of the parties is unequal, the weaker
party is usually in no position to shift or share any risk with his promi-
see. The promisor's willingness to perform the contract without
being able to shift all or part of the risk of the foreseeable event may
resemble an act of submission.64 The promisor in these cases becomes
a gambler, betting on the non-intervention of the foreseeable event.
Usually, the stronger party is in a better financial position to bear the
loss created by the supervening event than is his weaker promisor.
Thus, despite the foreseeability of the event, the court should be con-
scious of the promisor's ability to shift the risk in determining whether
the promisor should be held to have assumed the entire risk of the
foreseeable event.
Perhaps the reason courts have been reluctant to consider the bar-
gaining positions of the parties in determining risk assumption is due
to the traditional remedies administered in cases of impossibility.
Traditionally, the only remedy available where performance has be-
come impossible, was to completely discharge the contract leaving the
parties in the same position as they were at the time the supervening
event occurred. As a result of this remedy, the promisee lost the com-
plete value of his expectation interest, while the promisor had to bear
the loss of his reliance expenditures, absent any restitutionary recov-
ery.6 5 The Uniform Commercial Code has apparently taken the posi-
tion that in some situations the court should make equitable adjust-
ments between the parties and at the same time enforce the
contractual relationship.6 6 Consequently, with this recognition by the
Code that courts can adjust the rights and duties of the parties, per-
64. See Cuneo and Crowell, Impossibility of Performance Assumption of Risk or Act
of Submission, 29 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 531 (1964); Farnsworth, supra note 12, at
886; RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs, supra note 12, at 43. Relief
on the grounds of unconscionability is unlikely. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302,
Comment 1.
65. See generally Comment, Apportioning Loss After Discharge of a Burdensome
Contract: A Statutory Solution, 69 YALE L.J. 1054 (1960).
66. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615, Comment 6. See Note, UCC § 2-615:
Sharp Inflationary Increases In Cost As Excuse From Performance of Contract, supra
note 56, at 306-08.
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haps future courts may be more conscious of the bargaining position
of the parties in allocating the risk of the foreseeable event.
A final factor which is related to the bargaining positions of the
parties is the consideration of which party is in a better position to in-
sure against the disabling event, to bear the loss, or to distribute it."
This policy consideration allows the court to view the parties relative
to their commercial setting in determining the proper and equitable
allocation of loss resulting from non-performance by one of the par-
ties. For example, the fact that a promisor is a middleman capable of
spreading the risk over more individuals as opposed to a producer
may justify placing more risk upon him where he has failed to shift
the risk expressly in the contract and the event was foreseeable.68 The
equities of this result are supported by the drafters of the Proposed
Restatement of Contracts, wherein they state:
The fact that a supplier has not taken advantage of his opportunity
expressly to shift the risk of a shortage in his supply by means of
contract language may be regarded as more significant where he is
a middleman, with a variety of sources of supply and oppor-
tunity to spread the risk among many customers on many transac-
tions by slight adjustment of his prices, than where he is a producer
with a limited source of supply, few outlets, and no comparable op-
portunity.69
Moreover, the commercial trade usage or custom may indicate
whether a party was expected to insure or otherwise protect himself
against the risk.70 The failure of that party to take appropriate steps
outside the contractual arrangement to protect himself despite fore-
seeability of the risk may serve as an equitable ground for placing the
loss on him. This factor was the basis of the court's decision on risk
assumption in Canadian Industrial Alcohol Co. v. Dunbar Molasses
Co.71 In that case the middleman-seller was to supply molasses to the
buyer "of the usual run" of a named refinery. When the refinery re-
67. See generally Symposium, supra note 8, at 881-83; The Fetish of Impossibility,
supra note 1, at 99; Schlegel, supra note 1, at 442; Birmingham, A Second Look at the
Suez Canal Cases: Excuse or Non-performance of Contractual Obligation in the Light
of Economic Theory, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 1393 (1969).
68. See generally Symposium, supra note 8, at 894-95; The Fetish of Impossibility,
supra note 1, at 101-12.
69. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (SECOND) OF CONrRACTS, supra note 12, at 49.
70. See generally The Fetish of Impossibility, supra note 1, at 98 n.25; Schlegel, su-
pra note 1, at 442 n.l 15; RESTATEMENT OF THE LAw (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra
note 12, at 50. For further discussion, see text accompanying notes 22 through 23 su-
pra.
71. 258 N.Y. 194, 179 N.E. 383 (1932). See Crown Embroidery Works v. Gordon,
190 App. Div. 472, 180 N.Y.S. 158 (Ist Dep't 1920); Washington Mfg. Co. v. Midland
Lumber Co., 113 Wash. 593, 194 P. 777 (1921).
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duced its production below its normal level, the seller was unable to
meet his contract requirements with the buyer, and was unsuccessful
in obtaining molasses elsewhere. The seller sought to avoid plaintiff's
claims for damages on the grounds of impossibility of performance.
However, the court held the seller liable in damages since he had not
taken reasonable efforts at the time of contracting to assure his source
of supply by entering into a contract with his supplier. Here the court,
judging from the commercial setting, imposed on the seller a duty to
assure himself a source of supply. In some situations, cases may arise
where trade usage or customs would not have imposed a duty on the
promisor to take extraordinary steps to protect himself against the risk
of supervening event.
As has been demonstrated, many factors, in addition to foreseeabil-
ity, should be weighed by the court in determining whether a party
should be held to assume the risk of the foreseeable event. While in-
deed foreseeability is one policy consideration probative of risk as-
sumption, other policy considerations may call for the determination
of non-assumption of risk. These include: the nature, purpose, and
terms of the contract; the commercial senselessness of requiring per-
formance; the bargaining position of the parties; and the ability of the
parties to insure against, to bear or to distribute the loss.
CONCLUSION
An analysis of cases in which the impossibility doctrine has been
applied demonstrates that there must be a greater appreciation by the
courts of the need to apply a more realistic foreseeability test to com-
mercial contract situations. The fear that a more realistic test will
open the door to possible abuse of the doctrine of impossibility is un-
founded. The limits of good faith and reasonableness are adequate to
prevent abuse. Neither the need to provide certainty in the law nor the
simplistic administration of the doctrine justifies the failure of the
court to give a party relief in the proper case. Moreover, awareness
that foreseeability is only one factor probative of risk assumption and
that in some situations a party should be given relief regardless of
foreseeability, will lead to more just and equitable results under the
doctrine of impossibility.
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